17 Aralık operasyonunda tutuklanan eski Halkbank Genel Müdürü Marmaris’te yapılan suikast girişimi iddianamesini yazan eski Muğla. dışında kalacak şekilde röportaj yapıldığı, yine iddianamenin ileri FETÖ, 17 Aralık sonrasında bu stratejisinden vazgeçmiş, PKK terör. Bu yazılar, yayımlandıkları dönemde gerçekleştirilen ” Aralık gerektiren nedenler tutuklama kararında veya iddianamede somut.
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It could hardly have been otherwise: The success has not come without a cost. With only a month aarlk local elections, the ruling Justice and Development Party AKP seems set to weather its most serious challenge in more than half a decade. Significantly, unlike previous existential challenges—a threatened coup ina legal attempt to shut the party inor even the massive protests that shook Turkish cities in mid—this challenge has come from within the party and called into question nearly all of the pillars on which its electoral success rest.
Regulation as a Weapon: Shared interests helped to paper over many disagreements: Despite much chatter about potential splits, tensions remained submerged. The most serious disagreement before related to football: And then came the morning of December The mass arrests that day were actually connected with three distinct investigations.
The first centered on Reza Zerrab, an Iranian businessman who had made a fortune helping Turkish and Iranian companies skirt western sanctions. Though Turkey had secured an exemption allowing it to purchase oil and gas from Iran, it remained bound by March sanctions that had iddiannamesi Iran from SWIFT, the banking network that facilitates international transfers. In order to continue purchases, a system was devised whereby Iranian oil was purchased with Turkish lira. The lira in these accounts was then used to buy gold in Turkey and ship it to Iran.
The arrangement infuriated American lawmakers, but was tremendously beneficial to both Turkey and Iran: Zerrab made a fortune acting as a middleman between Turkish and Iranian companies.
The son of a well-connected Iranian steel-baron, he had initially worked in Dubai as a financial trader before moving to Turkey in and establishing a shipbuilding firm called Royal Maritime. The business was quite successful and Zerrab found himself hobnobbing with the Turkish elite—even marrying a famous singer.
Overtime iddiana,esi become more involved in trading precious metals until finally establishing a new firm, Safir Holdingin There arali snags along the way, of course: The second investigation, focused on a jddianamesi of construction magnates: Iddianakesi latter promised, but the former dragged his feet.
The final investigation also centered on construction projects—this time in the Fatih municipality. As to why the arrests had idianamesi made at this precise moment, sources suggested that the Interior Ministry had become aware of the investigation.
The aaralk caught the AKP off guard.
Demanding to know where the other Tweeter had heard such a thing, he was told that it was merely a joke. Within a day, however, steps had been taken to reign in the investigation.
In addition, the directors of the Istanbul units responsible for financial crime, smuggling, terrorism, organized crime, and public safety were all reassigned. More reassignments occurred later in the day in both Istanbul and Ankara.
iddianwmesi By late in the day, it was announced that decisions in the investigation would now require the approval of at least two of the prosecutors involved. Starting on December 18, he argued: In these struggles [of ours] the steps taken [against us] have international as much as national support.
Beyaz Saray darbesi – Son Dakika Haberi – Haberler | STAR
You can guess who these are. This was a process that started with the Gezi events, after which these new steps have been taken. I must say this very clearly: This is a species of gang. A state within a state. On Saturday, a number of suspects including Ali Agaoglu and Faith Mayor Mustafa Demir were released from detention, albeit on the condition that they remain in the country.
Back in Ankara, lawmakers passed new legislation iddianamrsi police and prosecutors idduanamesi inform their superiors of all investigations they were involved in. The following morning brought a new round of police reassignments as well as new regulations banning journalists from entering police stations.
We are passionate about the nation, we love it. These operations against our government: Prosecutors persisted in the face of government resistance. On Tuesday, news leaked that two new investigations were in the works. With local elections only three months away and several cabinet ministers agalk in mayoral races, the shake-up had been expected.
CHP’li Eren Erdem: Başıma bir şey gelirse sorumlusu AKP
Now, however, it was more sweeping and the choices to fill key positions far more predicated on loyalty than on political balancing. The three ministers under suspicion were all removed, as was the minister responsible for EU affairs whose name had subsequently come up in association with Zarrab. In leaving office, the ministers displayed starkly different attitudes: We are on the side of the legal process. The following months would test this commitment.
The HSYK oversaw the appointment, promotion, and disciplining of prosecutors and judges. Until four years earlier it had been composed of seven members—the Justice Minister, his undersecretary, and five members selected by the president from a pool of candidates proposed to him by the higher courts. This set up gave politicians an excessive degree of control over the judicial system in comparison to neighboring European countries, where such boards were usually selected by lawyers and judges themselves.
In order to move more closely in-line with European standards, the government had reformed the HSYK in When the group met, the Justice Minister served as the president of the body.
Generally, though, the HSYK was split into three smaller boards of seven—one responsible for appointments and transfers, a second for promotions, and a third for investigations. The HSYK statement was signed by thirteen of the twenty-one members—including the president of each board. Five members a majority of the boards overseeing promotions and investigations signed the statement, but only three of the seven-member board in charge of transfers approved.
Zaman gazetesinin eski başyazarı Ali Ünal hakim karşısına çıktı
More to the point, four members chose to write dissents— all but one came from the board responsible for transfers. Support for the government on the transfer board would prove crucial in coming weeks. In the face of leaks and pushback from within the 177, the government took a firm stand. If I possessed such authority, I would prosecute it right away.
With government officials asserting that prosecutors and judges were acting unconstitutionally, and with pro-government newspapers claiming that multiple Ergenekon prosecutors were acting in bad faith, the military entered the debate. This would likely include abolishing the special courts in which prosecutions of military officials as well as alleged Kurdish militants had taken place. Can a judiciary member go abroad twenty or twenty-two times a year?
Rather than take up his new post, he took vacation leave with the implication that he would hold out for his old job. Ultimately, however, he was transferred again—this time even further out of the way to the city of Bolu. Nor was he alone in being reassigned: The government might have better focused its purging energies elsewhere as, on the following day, Izmir, not Ankara, became the new site of corruption investigations. Early in the morning, simultaneous police raids in five different Turkish provinces resulted in twenty-seven detentions—and, ultimately, ten arrests.
Iddiahamesi investigation focused on corruption in the tendering process at the Turkish State Railways Authority. Like a game of whack-a-mole, however, the corruption investigations simply switched venues again: On January 18, five unit commanders were transferred; a week later idduanamesi officials from the Mersin Police Intelligence Unit were reassigned, as was the Provincial Police Chief.
Moving around police was easy; moving around prosecutors and judges required a bit more effort. During the course of the day, the government also released details of its new bill to reform the HSYK. The bill would give the Justice Minister sweeping new powers—in addition to more clearly codifying his power to speak for the board, it would also grant him the power to chose topics for it to discuss, initiate investigations of members, and appoint members to different sub-boards where currently they were chosen by a more complex process.
The sub-boards too would be rearranged with the first two reduced to five members each and third increased to eleven with its powers of investigation transferred to the smaller second board. Taken in sum, the changes gave the afalk clear control over the body, which, in turn, controlled the judiciary. For more than eighty hours, the committee discussed the various clauses, ultimately approving it with few significant changes. From there it moved on to the constitutional committee. As it made its way through the legislature, the bill provoked scuffles: The move was hardly a victory for the opposition.
With bills pending on iddianamsei trials, iddiaanmesi internet, and the security apparatus, the government was simply prioritizing its fights. By the time the bill was shelved, the Istanbul Attorney General, the Izmir prosecutor overseeing the port investigation, and ninety-five other judges and prosecutors around the country had also been reassigned. The storm iddianamesi to have passed. Proximity—but also conscious policy choices—have led the Turkish government into deep involvement with the civil war in neighboring Syria.
When fighting began inTurkish policy-makers initially tried to didianamesi the Syrian regime into compromise. When this tack showed few results, however, the Turkish government came out strongly against the regime. One of the few things that have continued to flow from Turkey into Syria during the subsequent two years wralk been weapons—forty-seven tons of them between June and December alone. Duringthe process has accelerated with rebels claiming September of to have marked iddianamei largest shipment yet.
Though the Turkish government hopes to strengthen certain rebel groups in northern Syria, others make it more skittish: As late as Januarythe Syrian regime was complimenting Syrian Kurds on their loyalty—which is true to the extent that the PYD finds itself fighting off attacks from many of the same groups in conflict with the regime itself. The Turkish government, however, is convinced that the PYD seeks to establish a semi-autonomous state similar to what Iraqi Kurds have achieved.
In essence, the government finds itself in a difficult position: In Novembera truck loaded with rockets, bazookas, and missiles heading toward the Syrian border was stopped by police. Yet, despite numerous reports to the contrary, the government continued to assert that it was not aiding militants, Al-Qaeda linked or otherwise. On January 1, gendarme in the southern province of Hatay received a tip off that a truck full of weapons was heading toward the Syrian border.
At this point the gendarme felt obligated to comply. The Adana aral general, however, directed local police further down the highway to stop the truck again.