Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data. Salanie, Bernard. [Theorie des contrats. English]. The economics of contracts: primer / Bernard Salanie. By Bernard Salanié; Abstract: The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic. The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. Article · January with 99 Reads. Cite this publication. Bernard Salanie at Columbia University. Bernard Salanie.
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This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: The following articles are merged in Scholar. The Economics of Contracts: My profile My library Metrics Alerts.
The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition, vol 1
Marc Henry Professor of Economics Verified email at psu. New articles by this author. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists.
Their combined citations are counted only for the first article. Search for items with the same title. Title Cited by Year The economics of contracts: For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics.
An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. New citations to this author.
Bernard Salanie – Google Scholar Citations
Does fertility respond to financial incentives? The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own.
Two chapters have been completely rewritten: It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. Koen Jochmans University of Cambridge Verified email at cam. Amit Gandhi University of Pennsylvania Verified email at upenn. Journal of Applied Cntracts 17 1, Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5.
Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: Journal of the Econometric Society, Verified email economice columbia. Here is how to contribute. Asymmetric information in insurance: Email address for updates.
D86 C70 search for similar items in EconPapers Date: The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. Should more risk-averse agents exert more effort?
The economics of contracts: Get my own profile Cited by View all All Since Citations h-index 39 27 iindex 69 Articles 1—20 Show more. Long-term, short-term and renegotiation: Is your work missing from RePEc? Articles Cited by Co-authors. The system can’t perform the operation now. The theory brenard contracts clntracts out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. Journal of Political Economy 3, Estimating preferences under risk: